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     Economists have long worked to understand the relationship between policing and crime. 
With a seemingly persistent issue of reverse causality, statistical methods including lagging and 
instrumental variables have been used in an attempt to work around that endogeneity problem. 
Recently COPS grants have been found to be a successful instrumental variable for sworn officer 
levels when predicting crime. Using panel data covering the largest U.S. cities from 1985-2010 
to reevaluate the endogeneity issue between policing and crime rates, I test COPS grants to see if 
they are a suitable instrument variable for police spending and find them insufficiently 
correlated. I conclude that crime rates are not a strong predictor of police spending, based largely 
on the persistence of police budgets. This allows me to predict crime rates using police spending 
without reverse causality bias. These regressions find that increased police spending results in 
modest decreases in rates of robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  
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Introduction and Background 
 
     Crime is an expensive problem. A study using the National Crime Survey calculated the cost 
to victims of violent crimes committed from 1987-1990 (Cohen, Miller, and Rossman 1993, 
186). In 1989 dollars, the cost of each murder was close to $2.4 million, and the total lifetime 
costs from these violent crimes committed from 1987-1990 was $178 billion. That is just for 
violent crime, adding property crime, which is more numerous, would raise the cost. If the 
concern for public safety alone were not enough, the high monetary cost of crime makes it an 
issue that demands attention.  
     Some of the earliest writings about law enforcement relating to economics were written by 
philosophers in the 18th century (Polinsky and Shavell 2005, 3). Not much was written since then 
until Gary Becker’s “Crime and Economics” was first published in 1968, a major moment in the 
economic analysis of crime. Becker created a model for how many offenses someone would 
commit. The main independent variables were probability of conviction and punishment if 
convicted, with remaining variables such as income from legal and illegal activities, and 
willingness to break the law (Becker 1974, 9). This was the groundwork for treating crime as a 
rational decision. Many of the implications of this research we still treat as standard assumptions 
today. Isaac Ehrlich expanded on the concept of treating criminals as rational beings. While 
acknowledging that much of the criminological literature of the day focused on deviant factors of 
criminal’s behavior and their motivations, he noted that he had not seen strong empirical 
evidence to support this (Ehrlich 1973, 521 – 522). He discussed the decision to commit crimes 
or not in terms of expected payoffs. It is through this reasoning that we can see the pathways in 
which we expect someone to commit crime or not.  
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     When the expected payoff from legitimate, law abiding activities goes up, we can expect a 
person to be less likely to commit a crime. When that expected payoff decreases, or the expected 
payoff from committing a crime goes up, someone becomes more likely to commit that crime. A 
true rational being will always choose whichever grants them a higher expected payoff. Hard to 
quantify variables, such as propensity towards crime, may remain. While this does not mean we 
see the whole picture, it does mean that we can predict changes in behavior based on how 
payoffs are changed.  
     The expected payoff of the crime-committing side of the equation is where we see the ways in 
which policing can decrease crime. Two important ways in which policing prevents crime are 
deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence works by decreasing the expected payoff of 
committing a crime, thus deterring people from choosing crime. More policeman on the street 
can make it more difficult to successfully pull off a robbery, thus reducing the chance of success. 
By reducing that chance of success, the expected payoff of that illegitimate behavior is reduced. 
Harsher sentences mean that caught criminals will spend more time in jail, and that is more time 
that they cannot make money, thus further decreasing the expected payoff of crime. These longer 
sentences also involve incapacitation. Generally speaking, individuals cannot commit crimes (are 
incapacitated) while they are in prison. As such, crime is reduced when crime-committing 
individuals are in a place where they cannot commit crimes. Harsher sentences mean that at any 
given time there are fewer crime-committing individuals out on the street (Dills, Miron, and 
Summers 2008, 6-7).  
     As the study of crime has progressed, it has followed this same vein of thought. When 
looking for the effect of additional economic and demographic factors one must answer the same 
question: what effect, if any, do these variables have on an individual’s decision to commit 
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crime? When one aggregates all those decisions, one effectively has the crime rate. All else 
being held equal, higher educated areas are expected to experience less crime, as people can earn 
strong incomes without the breaking the law. This does not consider the possibility that increased 
education can result in smarter criminals, who are likely better at avoiding detection and not 
being caught. Over time criminals can also become more proficient at committing crimes, which 
would further decrease their chances of getting caught. This would increase expected payoffs 
(İmrohoroğlu, Merlo, and Rupert 2006, 27). The way harsher sentencing was explained to reduce 
crime has no doubt influenced the harsher sentences seen in many parts of the country brought 
on to curb the increase in crime. More policing can reasonably be expected to decrease crime 
through the pathways just discussed. 
     Interestingly enough, the academic community has had trouble definitively concluding that 
increased policing reduces crime. In a time where many people feel that police departments are 
too powerful and overfunded, it is crucial that we evaluate just how effective police departments 
are in targeting crime. Are they the best recipient of public funds that are intended to reduce 
crime? 
     Unfortunately, this is not a simple question to answer. Society is complex, and as such, 
evaluating the effect of policing on crime is not easy. If it were, crime economists would have 
undoubtedly reached stronger conclusions by now. As regression analysis was used in an attempt 
to solve this question, new problems arose. One of the biggest hurdles, which has not yet been 
put to rest, is the possibility that crime affects policing. In an area with high crime, it reasonably 
follows that the level of policing might be increased in order to fight the high crime level. If this 
is true, a regression analysis of the effect of policing on crime would be tainted by reverse 
causality. Policing levels and crime would move in the same direction, showing a deceptive 
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positive correlation where a negative one would be expected. This issue is one that many studies 
have attempted to remedy. Less studies have re-evaluated this initial relationship to see how 
much of a problem exists. The issue of simultaneity is often assumed without being tested. 
     Some attempts to avoid this simultaneity issue did so through lagged models. By testing the 
effect of one year prior’s (or earlier) policing levels on today’s crime, one can check for an 
effect. This approach works on the assumption that this year’s crime cannot possibly affect last 
year’s policing, and as such the reverse causality bias has been prevented. Unfortunately, due to 
the nature and persistence of policing levels and crime rates, this has not always been successful. 
     Many recent studies have used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, instrumental variables 
in an attempt to circumvent this issue (Kovandzic and Worrall 2010, 508). Hypothetically, a 
strong instrumental variable (IV) could be used to predict policing levels, so long as it is 
endogenous to crime levels (Baker, Bound, and Jaeger 1995). It has proven difficult to find an IV 
that is strong enough to predict policing levels, yet plausibly uncorrelated to crime levels. One 
well known example was a 1997 paper by Steven Levitt. He reported success using mayoral 
elections to predict sworn officer levels, his count of policing (Levitt 1997). His argument was 
that incumbents would increase policing in elections year to reduce crime and assist them with 
re-election. While initial results were successful, a calculation error was discovered a few years 
later, and the results did not hold when the error was corrected (McCrary 2002). Some newer 
studies have found success using COPS grants as instrumental variables for policing, again using 
sworn officer levels as their metric for policing. 
    In this paper, I will reevaluate this issue of policing on crime, picking up where the literature 
has left off. I will be looking at the effect of city police spending on crime levels. Many former 
studies have used sworn officer levels, while I will use spending on police. The number of 
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officers in a police force and the amount of money budgeted to that force could have different 
effects. There have been documented measurement errors within the UCR data concerning sworn 
officer levels (Chalfin and McCrary 2013, 16). One benefit in using police spending instead is 
that I have sidestepped that issue. First, I will create a lagged model to see if crime rates affect 
police spending. This will be crucial in determining how large of an issue reverse causality is. 
Then I will add data on COPS grants to that model to see if the grants can still function as 
instrumental variables when predicting police spending, in contrast to sworn officer levels. 
Lastly, I will regress crime rates on police spending, to determine how effective, if at all, 
increased police spending is at reducing crime rates. 
     It is important to note that while the study of crime has advanced, this general model remains 
very far from being able to grasp the scope and complexity of this issue. Perhaps the primary 
flaw in this sort of analysis is its inherent assumption of fairness. It is not well prepared to 
account for potential bias, with racial bias being a main example. When viewing the decision to 
commit crime, it is possible to consider racial bias in some ways. While discussing the effect of 
education of an individual’s expected payoff to commit crime, Ehrlich notes that wage 
discrimination against non-white workers is higher in legitimate activities than in illegitimate 
activities (Ehrlich 1975, 322). This includes the return from education, nonwhites receive a 
smaller increase in expected legitimate earnings. The takeaway from this is that all else being 
equal, a nonwhite individual would be more likely to commit a crime than a white individual 
solely because nonwhites receive less from legitimate work. This does not say the nonwhite 
individual is more prone to commit crime in any behavioral sense, but rather they face a different 
set of circumstances, and therefore a different decision. 
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     While with sufficient data these factors can be brought in when evaluating the decision-
making process, this does not speak to how police and other public institutions may be biased 
towards nonwhite individuals. To properly investigate these possibilities, more data is needed. 
While this paper is focused on the relationship between police spending and city crime rates, it 
does not look to address these issues. If it were looking at how police spending affected crime 
rates amongst different racial groups, for example, the need for better data to compare how white 
and nonwhite individuals are treated differently would be clear. 
 
     Data 
      
     This paper uses panel data on the largest U.S. cities to observe the relationship between police 
spending and crime rates from 1985 to 2010. The unit of observation is the city, while the unit of 
time is the year. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this paper are available at the end. 
There are three tables of descriptive statistics, each for a different year, in an attempt to 
demonstrate how the data has changed over time. Table 1.1 is for data in 1985, the first year of 
the study. Table 2.2 is for data in 1994, which is the first year that COPS grants were available. 
Table 3.3 gives descriptive statistics for 2010, the final year of this study. Table 6 contains a 
correlation matrix for all variables used.  
     Data from a variety of sources was gathered and merged to allow these regressions. The core 
of the dataset is annual urban financial data generously provided by the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy). This Fiscally Standardized Cities (FiSC) dataset allots 
revenue and expenditures from cities and counties to their appropriate geographic locations for 
the largest US cities. This means that for spending variables, the FiSC will combine spending by 
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the city, as well as the portion of spending by the county corresponding to the number of people 
from the county living within the city. While there are updated FiSC datasets with more cities, I 
am using the initial stage which contains 112 cities from 38 states (Langley 2016). For that stage, 
all cities with a population over 100,000 in 1980 were included so long as they had a population 
of at least 200,000 in 2010. All cities with a population above 150,000 in 1980 were included 
regardless of their population in 2010. The dataset was pared down to 103 cities that were 
deemed suitable for this analysis, representing 36 states. In 1985, the earliest year of my study, 
populations ranged from 113,243 to 7,234,514, with a median of 245,472. That median grew to 
306,687 in 2010, the final year of the study, with a low of 82,724 and a high of 8,131,574.  Per 
capita spending on police protection is used to represent police spending. The FiSC dataset also 
provides population data and data on intergovernmental grants coming from both the state and 
federal levels, as well as non-police spending per capita, which were all used in this analysis. 
     Data on crime rates comes from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program run by the 
FBI, which has been available at the city level since 1985. All rates are per-100,000 population 
and are self-reported by local police departments to the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
2004). This is the same data used in the majority of studies on crime rates in the U.S. There are 
seven different types of offenses, known as index crimes, organized into two categories: violent 
crime and property crime. Violent crime consists of criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated 
assault, and robbery. Property crime is made up of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle 
theft. These index crimes have an established hierarchy which applies in multiple-offense 
situations. A multiple-offense situation is when more than one offense is carried out at the same 
time by the same offender. For the purpose of crime reporting, only the most serious offence will 
be counted in the crime statistics when this happens. The hierarchy is as follows, beginning with 
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the most severe; criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft, and motor vehicle theft. The variables “New Violent Rate” and “New Property Rate” will 
be discussed later. 
     Data on COPS grants comes from the COPS office. The variable “COPS” represents the per 
capita dollar amount of all grants received by a city in a given year. These grants were first 
offered in 1994, and were offered through the end of the study, albeit there are many city-years 
during which no grants are received. There are a variety of different grants under the umbrella of 
COPS grants, all of which are for police departments. They are usually separated by their 
purpose, such as money for hiring officers or money for purchasing new equipment. I aggregated 
these amounts each year, resulting in 967 observations where grants are awarded. That is less 
than half the total number of observations available in the dataset. 
     The following demographic data comes from the decennial census (United States Census 
Bureau). “Age” represents the median age of the population, while “Youth” represents the 
percentage of the population aged 15 to 24. “High School” is the percentage of the population 
above the age of 25 that has a high school degree or greater, while “College” represents the 
percentage of the population older than 25 that has a college degree or higher. There are three 
variables to represent race & ethnicity. “White” is the percentage of the population that reports as 
non-Hispanic white. “Black” is the percentage of the population reported as black. “Hispanic” is 
the percentage of the population that reports to be Hispanic. These variables were linearly 
interpolated for the intercensal years. 
     Income data comes from the decennial census and the ACS. Median income is reported as 
well as income inequality, which was calculated as mean income divided by median income. 
After the 2000 Census, economic variables were moved from the decennial census to the ACS. 
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This means income data is available for 1980, 1990, 2000, 2007, and 2010. One benefit of 
switching to the ACS is having data points nearby on both sides of the 2008 financial crisis, 
which assisted with interpolating income data. Income data was linearly interpolated. 
     Incarceration rates are gathered from the National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) program, carried 
out by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. This is annual data present at the state level. A variable 
was created for the percentage of the state’s population that is in prison, termed “Prison.” Ideally 
city level data would be used, but reliable data was not readily available. 
     Unemployment data comes from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) and is at 
the metropolitan area level. Data from the LAUS is monthly, it was averaged to create annual 
values. This data is available beginning in 1990. For the years prior to 1990, I have state-level 
LAUS data. Metropolitan area values were extrapolated by making the metropolitan rates and 
their respective state rates have the same annual percent change for the years prior to 1990. I then 
worked backward from 1990 filling in each year. While city level data would usually be 
preferable, it is very common for people to commute to work in one part of a metropolitan area 
from another, so in this instance using metropolitan level data is suitable.  
     Many of the explanatory variables were interpolated, and as such there is surely variation, 
especially in the economic variables, that was not captured. A dataset with annual values for all 
variables would be ideal but was not possible for this timeframe. I feel comfortable interpolating 
those variables as they are not the main variables being scrutinized in this study. The primary 
variables being looked at, police spending and crime rates, are available annually, and no 





     Methodology 
 
     The analyses in this paper are all panel regressions using fixed effects. Panel regressions are 
naturally performed due to the nature of the data. Fixed effects are used to focus on variation 
within cities over time. The dataset does not contain sufficient variables to explain the variation 
between cities, and many unobserved factors no doubt remain. Time independent city specific 
characteristics cannot be described with the available data. As such I chose to look at variation 
within cities. With 103 cities across 26 years there are 2678 observations. Due to cities lacking 
data for occasional years, and the use of lagged variables, the actual number of observations in 
each regression is between 2400 and 2600. This drops down to 939 when using COPS grants as 
an IV. All variables are presented in logs so as to represent percentage changes. 
      Year fixed effects are included to account for any changes only correlated to time. There was 
a massive reduction in both violent and property crime in the United States in the 1990’s 
(Donohue III and Levitt 2000, 1). Without variables for those years, the regression might 
attribute those decreases to other variables that changed throughout that timeframe in a similar 
manner, even if they are not plausibly correlated. 
 








 Regressing Police Spending on Crime 
 
     I begin the analysis by regressing police spending on crime in a fixed effects model: 
 
ln(policespending)it = β0 + β1ln(totalcrimerate)i,t-1 + β2ln(policespending)i,t-1 + β3ln(non-
policespending)it + β4ln(citypopulation)i,t-1 + β5(ln(citypopulation)
2)i,t-1 + β6ln(medianincome)i,t-1 
+ β7ln(stateaid)it + β8ln(federalaid)it + β9ln(age)i,t-1 + β10ln(youth)i,t-1 + β11ln(white)i,t-1 + 
β12ln(black)i,t-1 + β13ln(hispanic)i,t-1 + β14ln(unemploymentmetro)i,t-1 + β15ln(incomeinequality)i,t-1 
+ β16ln(highschool)i,t-1 + β17ln(college)i,t-1 + β18ln(prison)i,t-1 + δ1timedummy1986t + 
δ2timedummy1987t … δ24timedummy2010t + μit 
 
     The results for this regression are available in table 2.1. They appear alongside two variations: 
replacing totalcrimerate with violentcrimerate, and then with propertycrimerate. Table 2.2 shows 
the same regression but replacing totalcrimerate with the individual violent crime rate, while 
table 2.3 does the same for each category of property crime. Nearly all the variables here are 
lagged one year in an attempt to capture the situation in the city when the budget was being 
prepared. The variables that are not lagged are non-police spending, state grants, and federal 
grants. These are not lagged as the clearest way they affect police spending is by being present in 
the same budget, thus requiring them to be the same year. 
     Crime variables are lagged as far back as five years in order to test for significance. This is 
done for all variations mentioned prior; totalcrimerate, violentcrimerate, propertycrimerate, as 
well as for each category individually. The effect and statistical significance of these crime 
variables are inconsistent. Total crime rate is not significant at any point. Violent crime rate is 
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only significant at one point, at the 95% level when lagged four years. Property crime rate is not 
significant at any point. Due to the size of the dataset, these longer lags start to substantially 
reduce the predictive power of the model. When looking at the regression using the total crime 
rate, the within R-squared falls from .7060 at a 1-year lag, to .6335 with a 5-year lag. That is one 
reason why the regressions included have a 1-year lag. 
     Discussion of other explanatory variables is based on the model using the total crime rate 
lagged one year. Lagged police spending, population (both linear and squared), age, and median 
income were the most statistically significant variables, all significant at the 99.9% level. Percent 
Hispanic was significant at the 99% level, while percent black, youth, federal grants, and non-
police spending were significant at the 95% level. Lagged police spending, age, and the two 
population variables, while decreasing in significance, remained significant at the 99.9% level 
for each regression as the crime variables were lagged back to five years. Median income fell to 
99% at the 5-year lag, and all the other variable decreased in significance and fell to lower 
significance levels or ceased to be significant. All of the significant coefficients were positive 
with the exception of population which had a coefficient of -2.628, though population squared 
was positive with a coefficient of .102. This indicates that all else being equal, increasing 
population would result in decreasing police spending per person until the population increase 
exceeds 25.76%, at which point per-person spending on policing would increase. With the 
average city population in this sample being 464,107 in 1985; a population increase of up to 
119,531 would result in lower per capita police spending. After that point, police spending per 
capita would increase. In 2010, the point at which per capita police spending would increase 
would be at a population increase of 140,774. Non-police spending has a coefficient of .059 with 
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a t-score of 2.25, and lagged police spending has a coefficient of .48 and a t-score of 25.64, by 
far the highest t-score in the regression. 
     This points to how persistent police spending is in cities. Spending is dominated by spending 
history with large influences from demographic variables. When coefficients on crime are 
significant, they are much smaller than these coefficients. So even then, the effect on police 
spending would be small compared to budgetary and other demographic factors. It is also curious 
as to how scattered many of the significant crime variables are, with many occurring at four and 
five year lags. This may be indicative of how people view crime. A Pew Research Study in 2016 
found that the majority of those asked felt crime had gotten worse in the country since 2008 
(Gramlich 2016). This is in contradiction to the fact that crime rates had fallen in that span. 
Perhaps when it comes to crime people are pessimistic. Or perhaps people hold onto older 
notions of crime, and even when things have improved, they still feel it is bad. This could 
explain how crime can have an effect with a significant lag, though that is only a theory than 
cannot be proven here. 
     Regressing police spending on crime has shown how persistent police budgets are, and crime 
rates have not been found to be a strong predictor of police levels. This seems to indicate that 
reverse causality is not a severe problem, as police spending has not been influenced by crime. 
However, as sporadic as they are, there are still points where crime rates can be seen to influence 
police spending, and as such I cannot say for certain that police spending is determined 
independently of crime rates. 





     COPS Grants as an IV 
 
     Here I test COPS grants as a viable IV for police spending. The first stage of the model is the 
same as the model from the prior section, with the addition of a variable to represent COPS 
grants. 
 
ln(policespending)it = β0 + β1ln(copsgrants)it + β2ln(non-policespending)it + 
β3ln(policespending)i,t-1 + β4ln(totalcrimerate)i,t-1 + β5ln(citypopulation)i,t-1 + 
β6(ln(citypopulation)
2)i,t-1 + β7ln(medianincome)i,t-1 + β8ln(stateaid)it + β9ln(federalaid)it + 
β10ln(age)i,t-1 + β11ln(youth)i,t-1 + β12ln(white)i,t-1 + β13ln(black)i,t-1 + β14ln(hispanic)i,t-1 + 
β15ln(unemploymentmetro)i,t-1 + β16ln(incomeinequality)i,t-1 + β17ln(highschool)i,t-1 + 
β18ln(college)i,t-1 + β19ln(prison)i,t-1 + δ1timedummy1986t + δ2timedummy1987t … 
δ24timedummy2010t + μit 
      
     I run four versions of this regression to test the effectiveness of COPS grants as an 
instrumental variable. These are available in table 3, along with my baseline regression for 
predicting police spending for comparison, which is the first regression in the table. For the first 
COPS regression, the variable “COPS” represents the per capita value of COPS grants awarded 
to each city in the appropriate year. Seeing as these grants only began in 1994, this made the 
sample size much smaller. The sample size was further diminished by the fact that COPS grants 
were not awarded to all cities in all years. The number of observations dropped from 2506 down 
to 939. For the second variation, I created a new variable for COPS grants, “COPS2”, that gave 
all cities which did not receive a grant a grant value of .00000001 to allow them to be included in 
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the sample. That value could not be set to zero, as those observations would again be omitted 
after the log transformation. For the third variation, I made a binary variable, “COPS Binary”, 
for weather or not a city received COPS grants. In the fourth variation, I included the binary 
variable, as well as an interaction between the binary variable and the COPS2 variable (COPS 
Interaction). The latter three variations brought the number of observations back up to 2506. 
     These regressions do not produce any statistically significant coefficients for any of the COPS 
variables. The first variation changes many of the coefficients on the other explanatory variables, 
as so many observations are removed. The other three variations have almost identical 
coefficients to the original regression that does not have COPS grants. Having failed in the first 
stage, there will be no second stage regression. 
     While COPS grants have been used successfully in other studies, it is still worth addressing if 
they are reasonably endogenous in order to be used as an IV in this case. There are various 
different programs within the COPS grant program. These have different requirements, and the 
requirements also changed over time. One notable distribution requirement of COPS grants in 
the 1990’s was that half of the funds went to communities with populations greater than 150,000, 
and half went to communities with populations below that amount. Agencies had to apply for the 
grants, stating what community-oriented policing they would implement with the grants (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2005, 7). In a new series of COPS funds released in 2009, 
questions concerning fiscal health and crime rates were included in the application. Any agency 
with primary law enforcement responsibility was eligible to accept (Mello 2018, 5). At least half 
the funds had to go to jurisdiction with populations above 150,000, and each state was set to 
receive at least 1.5% of COPS Hiring Program (CHP) funding. In his 2018 paper, Steven Mello 
states that cites receiving grants had similar trends to police and crime prior to the 2009 round of 
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funds which he was analyzing. I feel that while the application process is complicated and I 
cannot fully view it here, it cannot be said to be completely exogenous. Agencies choose to 
apply, and it follows that agencies with more severe crime issues would be more pressed to apply 
for funds, and furthermore that crime rates are a factor in the application process. Had this been 
successful in the first stage, a more thorough examination of the plausible endogeneity would be 
necessary. 
     COPS grants do have maintenance of effort conditions (Roth and Ryan 2000, 1). 
Additionally, it was often required that grantees matched a portion of the grant in the initial 
round of grants. The COPS Hiring Recovery Program (CHRP) began in 2009 and did not require 
any match, though it did continue the maintenance of effort requirement (Cook et al 2017, 7). 
CHRP grants are included in the COPS program data I used. If properly followed, this should 
prevent any displacement effect. Any deviation from this would greatly reduce the ability of the 
model to find a positive relationship between the grants and police spending. 
     There are differences between this test for an IV and those studies that have successfully used 
COPS grants. The primary difference is that other studies used sworn officer levels rather than 
police spending as their metric for police. This allows for more plausible endogeneity, as not all 
COPS grants are hiring grants. While the overall amount of grants could be connected to crime 
rates, the portion of those that are for hiring may not have as strong a connection. Furthermore, 
the analysis is more straightforward with police levels. When looking at overall grant amounts, 
the money could be earmarked for different areas of policing, some of which may be more 
effective at reducing crime than others. 




     Regressing Crime on Police Spending 
 
     I now proceed to regress crime on police spending. Still using a panel regression with fixed 
effects, it is specified as follows:  
 
ln(totalcrimerate)it = β0 + β1ln(totalcrimerate)i,t-1 + β2ln(policespending)it + β3ln(non-
policespending)it + β4ln(citypopulation)it + β5(ln(citypopulation)
2)it + β6ln(medianincome)it + 
β7ln(stateaid)it + β8ln(federalaid)it + β9ln(age)it + β10ln(youth)it + β11ln(white)it + β12ln(black)it + 
β13ln(hispanic)it + β14ln(unemploymentmetro)it + β15ln(incomeinequality)it + β16ln(highschool)it + 
β17ln(college)it + β18ln(prison)it + δ1timedummy1986t + δ2timedummy1987t … 
δ24timedummy2010t + μit 
 
     The results for this regression can be found in table 4.1, alongside regressions where violent 
crime rates and property crime rates str used. Table 4.2 breaks down violent crime into its 
individual index crimes and table 4.3 breaks down property crime into its index crimes. In all 
regressions the one-year lag of the crime variable being regressed is a strong predictor for all 
crime rates; always positive and significant at the 99.9% level. Police spending has a negative 
coefficient whenever it was significant. A 100% increase in police spending would cause 
reductions of 4.61% to the total crime rate, 4.19% to the violent crime rate, and 4.25% to the 
property crime rate. These are significant at the 99.9% level, 95% level, and 99% level, 
respectively. These strong inverse relationships mean this model is not affected by reverse 
causality when examining the relationship between police spending and crime, as that would 
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require the signs for police spending on crime to be the same as those for crime on police 
spending, which is not the case.  
     Breaking down violent crime shows that robbery is the only type of violent crime 
significantly reduced by police spending, where doubling police spending would reduce robbery 
by 7.18%, significant at 99.9%. This is such a strong effect that it makes the whole category of 
violent crimes significant, even though it is the only violent index crime which is. For the 
property crimes, increasing police spending by 100% with all else equal would reduce burglary 
by 5.63%, larceny by 3.13%, and vehicle theft by 5.65%. The effect on burglary is significant at 
the 99% level, while the effects on larceny and vehicle theft are significant at 95%. When 
looking at the crime rates when grouped together, i.e. total crime, violent crime, or property 
crime, it is easy to assume that the reduction would apply equally to the individual index crimes. 
When examining the index crimes independently, it is apparent that they are not affected equally. 
Individual categories can have strong enough effects to sway the overall category. This 
reinforces the importance of examining index crimes individually, not just the categories in 
broad strokes. 
     To represent this another way, I have calculated the dollar cost of reducing crimes if the year 
were 2010, based on the average city. This city has a population of 546,485 and spends 378 
dollars per person on policing for a total of $206,571,330. That city suffers 59 murders, 238 
incidences of rape, 2,547 assaults, 1,580 robberies, 6,646 burglaries, 16,243 occurrences of 
larceny, and 2,740 cases of motor vehicle theft that year. By doubling their police spending to 
$413,142,660, we can expect 113 fewer robberies, 374 fewer burglaries, 508 fewer occurrences 
of larceny, and 155 fewer cases of motor vehicle theft. The reduction in murders, rapes, and 
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assaults are not significant enough to be recorded here. I leave it up to the reader to determine if 
that is a worthwhile use of funds. 
      
     Categorizing Robbery 
 
     In the UCR database, robbery is considered a violent crime. This is because robbery involves 
force or force of threat, which makes it distinct from property crimes. I initially found this 
designation to be curious, as the motivation for robbery, presumable pecuniary gain, should be 
more similar to that of property crimes, than to that of the other violent crimes. When looking at 
the effect of crimes, designation as violent is reasonable, as the outcome is violent. When 
looking at how policing deters crime, the motivation becomes more important. Robbery is the 
only violent crime that is affected by police spending, while all the property crimes are. This 
supports the notion that robbery may better belong to property crimes for the purpose of this 
analysis. I have created new violent and property crime categories, which remove robbery from 
violent crimes, and places it in property crimes. The regression is then performed the same way 
as when regressing crime on police spending. The results can be seen in table 5. Policing has no 
effect on the new violent crime rate, and has a slightly stronger, and more significant, effect on 
the new property crime rate than on the old rate. A 100% increase in police spending would 
decrease property crime by 4.37%, significant at the 99% level. While I do not think that robbery 
should always be counted as a property crime, it can beneficial when evaluate the ways in which 
we expect policing to work. While robbery is a forceful, violent crime, the motivations, and as 





     Conclusion 
 
     This paper is unable to reach a solid conclusion on how changes in crime lead to changes in 
police spending. Furthermore, using COPS grants as an instrumental variable is not successful 
here with police spending, as it has been with sworn officer levels. Despite that however, the 
model is able to predict that changes in police spending can reduce robbery, burglary, larceny, 
and vehicle theft, which is the expected result based upon the literature. These results show the 
model has not negatively affected by reverse causality, as is often the case in studies on crime 
and police spending. Lastly, this study has indicated that the categorization of robbery should be 
more closely examined and potentially reconsidered when looking at the motivations behind it, 

















Table 1.1 – 1985 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Crime Rate 102 8813.632 2584.672 4006.700 16936.800 
Violent Crime Rate 102 1021.329 588.035 176.000 2913.700 
Property Crime Rate 103 7787.490 2167.267 3687.700 14587.900 
Murder Rate 103 14.296 10.001 2.000 58.200 
Rape Rate 102 72.503 33.892 15.600 191.000 
Assault Rate 103 516.419 325.661 73.600 1913.200 
Robbery Rate 103 427.245 301.216 47.200 1537.600 
Burglary Rate 103 2234.330 811.157 1047.100 4665.200 
Larceny Rate 103 4754.415 1377.726 1855.800 9001.300 
Vehicle Theft Rate 103 798.743 569.571 144.200 3452.400 
New Violent Rate 102 598.692 349.988 110.400 2135.700 
New Property Rate 103 8214.732 2344.948 3787.200 15542.400 
Police Spending 103 233.0822 75.227 118.983 446.905 
Non-Police Spending 103 3500.420 1162.525 1711.312 8289.392 
City Population 103 464016.500 820654.200 113243.000 7234514.000 
Median Income 103 47769.890 10020.790 31163.35. 84500.460 
State Aid 103 1044.435 482.870 429.796 3409.808 
Federal Aid 103 210.948 113.412 46.678 569.719 
Age 103 30.425 2.203 26.050 40.350 
Youth 103 18.131 2.411 13.050 26.650 
White 103 .645 .178 .158 .970 
Black 103 .208 .173 .00450 .757 
Hispanic 103 .112 .150 .00550 .810 
Unemployment 103 6.833 2.257 3.696 14.650 
Income Inequality 103 1.268 .0879 1.104 1.620 
College 103 20.061 6.278 7.250 40.050 
High School 103 71.612 8.653 48.200 89.350 
Prison 103 .00201 .000661 .000560 .00437 
COPS 0 













Table 1.2 – 1994 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Crime Rate 101 9052.350 2867.186 4353.400 18070.800 
Violent Crime Rate 101 1372.399 735.112 270.900 3750.700 
Property Crime Rate 102 7676.373 2321.477 3758.900 16483.300 
Murder Rate 102 18.667 14.1867 1.000 77.200 
Rape Rate 101 68.200 29.124 20.700 155.900 
Assault Rate 102 766.638 471.802 86.800 2243.400 
Robbery Rate 102 532.429 329.405 89.400 1543.100 
Burglary Rate 102 1731.275 657.620 714.300 3680.000 
Larceny Rate 102 4721.993 1501.528 2073.600 10658.400 
Vehicle Theft Rate 102 1223.102 683.569 221.300 3736.800 
New Violent Rate 101 846.686 490.074 128.400 2379.700 
New Property Rate 102 8208.799 2518.485 3895.000 17312.300 
Police Spending 103 278.128 91.814 120.065 596.059 
Non-Police Spending 103 4084.275 1298.561 1980.138 8829.075 
City Population 103 499078.600 852162.100 113217.000 7506166.000 
Median Income 103 48766.500 11150.540 30249.420 95160.860 
State Aid 103 1277.844 517.00910 478.276 2782.225 
Federal Aid 103 116.789 82.567 6.805 396.081 
Age 103 32.006 2.101 26.140 38.880 
Youth 103 15.868 2.356 11.200 24.480 
White 103 .575 .183 .0978 .940 
Black 103 .223 .186 .00860 .820 
Hispanic 103 .146 .170 .00560 .887 
Unemployment 103 5.847 2.363 2.217 15.808 
Income Inequality 103 1.327 .101 1.135 1.745 
College 103 23.420 7.427 8.540 44.480 
High School 103 76.292 8.191 47.100 91.320 
Prison 103 .00376 .00129 .000992 .00637 















Table 1.3 – 2010 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Crime Rate 99 5492.681 1784.432 1911.500 10501.000 
Violent Crime Rate 101 807.827 412.333 189.700 2377.900 
Property Crime Rate 100 4682.724 1499.807 1454.800 8557.600 
Murder Rate 102 10.887 10.575 .800 64.800 
Rape Rate 101 43.708 22.564 9.800 114.500 
Assault Rate 102 466.609 261.228 76.500 1559.100 
Robbery Rate 102 289.470 171.656 57.400 801.600 
Burglary Rate 102 1217.293 632.126 219.300 3559.400 
Larceny Rate 100 2974.937 952.470 1064.400 5460.700 
Vehicle Theft Rate 102 501.865 284.254 113.100 1765.800 
New Violent Rate 101 520.720 279.487 91.800 1700.600 
New Property Rate 100 4972.068 1600.404 1686.900 9223.100 
Police Spending 103 378.218 123.139 166.072 796.397 
Non-Police Spending 103 5236.509 1586.625 2766.204 11948.850 
City Population 103 546485.300 913982.300 82724.000 8131574.000 
Median Income 103 43621.100 11342.560 24021.000 92269.000 
State Aid 103 1618.815 717.059 515.073 4058.935 
Federal Aid 103 175.214 102.389 23.395 568.894 
Age 103 33.740 2.687 28.500 42.200 
Youth 103 16.105 2.682 11.20 24.500 
White 103 .459 .175 .0420 .840 
Black 103 .238 .198 .0100 .848 
Hispanic 103 .2163 .194 .0160 .947 
Unemployment 103 9.657 2.349 4.225 16.892 
Income Inequality 103 1.399 .109 1.174 1.763 
College 103 29.465 9.487 11.400 56.500 
High School 103 83.402 6.172 52.900 94.800 
Prison 103 .00466 .00145 .00173 .00868 





Table 2.1 – Results of Police Spending – Total, Violent, Property 
 
 With Total Crime 
Rate 










Log Non-Police Spending 0.0590* 0.0579* 0.0573* 
 (2.25) (2.21) (2.17) 
    
Log Police Spending 0.480*** 0.481*** 0.447*** 
(Lagged) (25.64) (25.74) (24.48) 
    
Log Total Crime Rate 0.0293   
(Lagged) (1.75)   
    
Log Violent Crime Rate  0.0137  
(Lagged)  (1.25)  
    
Log Property Crime Rate   0.0257 
(Lagged)   (1.56) 
 
Log City Population -2.628*** -2.667*** -2.683*** 
(Lagged) (-4.99) (-5.04) (-5.12) 
    
Log City Population Squared 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
(Lagged) (4.90) (4.95) (5.03) 
    
Log Median Income 0.349*** 0.358*** 0.385*** 
(Lagged) (4.22) (4.34) (4.63) 
    
Log State Aid 0.0270 0.0276 0.0282 
 (1.46) (1.50) (1.52) 
    
Log Federal Aid 0.0109* 0.0108* 0.0108* 
 (2.20) (2.19) (2.17) 
    
Log Age 0.681*** 0.716*** 0.734*** 
(Lagged) (4.07) (4.34) (4.38) 
    
Log Youth 0.164* 0.179* 0.182* 
(Lagged) (2.15) (2.38) (2.38) 
    
Log White -0.0555 -0.0555 -0.0630 
(Lagged) (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.84) 
    
Log White 0.0403* 0.0404* 0.0444* 
(Lagged) (2.22) (2.22) (2.44) 
    
Log Hispanic 0.0398** 0.0430*** 0.0431*** 
(Lagged) (3.06) (3.42) (3.30) 
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Log Unemployment 0.0207 0.0236 0.0230 
(Lagged) (1.41) (1.61) (1.56) 
    
Log Income Inequality 0.304 0.311 0.395* 
(Lagged) (1.72) (1.76) (2.24) 
    
Log College -0.122 -0.135 -0.125 
(Lagged) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-1.75) 
    
Log High School 0.194 0.229 0.202 
(Lagged) (1.54) (1.83) (1.59) 
    
Log Prison -0.0131 -0.0154 -0.0109 
(Lagged) (-0.71) (-0.84) (-0.59) 
N 2506 2511 2534 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 2.2 – Results of Police Spending – Violent Breakdown 
 
















Log Non-Police Spending 0.0546* 0.0571* 0.0562* 0.0553* 
 (2.07) (2.18) (2.14) (2.10) 
     
Log Police Spending 0.449*** 0.480*** 0.448*** 0.449*** 
(Lagged) (24.56) (25.69) (24.57) (24.60) 
     
Log Murder Rate 0.00207    
(Lagged) (0.29)    
     
Log Rape Rate  0.0113   
(Lagged)  (1.21)   
     
Log Assault Rate   0.00416  
(Lagged)   (0.54)  
     
Log Robbery Rate    0.0135 
(Lagged)    (1.27) 
 
Log City Population -2.669*** -2.603*** -2.697*** -2.706*** 
(Lagged) (-5.09) (-4.95) (-5.12) (-5.16) 
     
Log City Population Squared 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
(Lagged) (4.99) (4.86) (5.02) (5.06) 
     
Log Median Income 0.392*** 0.368*** 0.396*** 0.389*** 
(Lagged) (4.72) (4.44) (4.77) (4.69) 
     
Log State Aid 0.0299 0.0282 0.0284 0.0305 
 (1.61) (1.53) (1.53) (1.64) 
     
Log Federal Aid 0.0108* 0.0106* 0.0106* 0.0108* 
 (2.18) (2.16) (2.14) (2.18) 
     
Log Age 0.767*** 0.713*** 0.783*** 0.739*** 
(Lagged) (4.62) (4.32) (4.75) (4.40) 
     
Log Youth 0.191* 0.189* 0.201** 0.189* 
(Lagged) (2.49) (2.51) (2.66) (2.48) 
     
Log White -0.0573 -0.0537 -0.0608 -0.0606 
(Lagged) (-1.67) (-1.58) (-1.78) (-1.78) 
     
Log Black 0.0452* 0.0401* 0.0462* 0.0425* 
(Lagged) (2.48) (2.20) (2.55) (2.30) 
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Log Hispanic 0.0469*** 0.0433*** 0.0474*** 0.0433*** 
(Lagged) (3.71) (3.45) (3.79) (3.35) 
     
Log Unemployment 0.0254 0.0252 0.0260 0.0241 
(Lagged) (1.73) (1.71) (1.77) (1.64) 
     
Log Income Inequality 0.391* 0.325 0.405* 0.392* 
(Lagged) (2.21) (1.83) (2.29) (2.22) 
     
Log College -0.149* -0.147* -0.144* -0.136 
(Lagged) (-2.11) (-2.09) (-2.04) (-1.91) 
     
Log High School 0.246 0.248* 0.240 0.241 
(Lagged) (1.95) (1.98) (1.91) (1.92) 
     
Log Prison -0.0119 -0.0158 -0.0132 -0.0112 
(Lagged) (-0.64) (-0.86) (-0.71) (-0.60) 
N 2531 2511 2539 2539 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 2.3 – Results of Police Spending – Property Breakdown 
 
 With Burglary Rate With Larceny Rate With Vehicle Theft 
Rate 






Log Non-Police Spending 0.0545* 0.0590* 0.0558* 
 (2.07) (2.24) (2.12) 
    
Log Police Spending 0.449*** 0.447*** 0.448*** 
(Lagged) (24.58) (24.45) (24.56) 
    
Log Burglary Rate 0.0123   
(Lagged) (0.96)   
    
Log Larceny  0.0300  
(Lagged)  (1.93)  
    
Log Vehicle Theft   0.00286 
(Lagged)   (0.36) 
 
Log City Population -2.672*** -2.689*** -2.673*** 
(Lagged) (-5.11) (-5.14) (-5.10) 
    
Log City Population Squared 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 
(Lagged) (5.01) (5.04) (5.00) 
    
Log Median Income 0.398*** 0.384*** 0.391*** 
(Lagged) (4.79) (4.61) (4.69) 
    
Log State Aid 0.0298 0.0260 0.0294 
 (1.61) (1.40) (1.58) 
    
Log Federal Aid 0.0107* 0.0108* 0.0105* 
 (2.16) (2.18) (2.13) 
    
Log Age 0.758*** 0.736*** 0.775*** 
(Lagged) (4.55) (4.42) (4.68) 
    
Log Youth 0.196* 0.179* 0.200** 
(Lagged) (2.58) (2.34) (2.62) 
    
Log White -0.0628 -0.0623 -0.0599 
(Lagged) (-1.84) (-1.83) (-1.76) 
    
Log Black 0.0455* 0.0459* 0.0459* 
(Lagged) (2.51) (2.53) (2.51) 
    
Log Hispanic 0.0437*** 0.0429*** 0.0467*** 
(Lagged) (3.35) (3.32) (3.70) 
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Log Unemployment 0.0237 0.0242 0.0253 
(Lagged) (1.60) (1.65) (1.72) 
    
Log Income Inequality 0.402* 0.383* 0.400* 
(Lagged) (2.28) (2.17) (2.27) 
    
Log College -0.139 -0.122 -0.143* 
(Lagged) (-1.96) (-1.71) (-2.03) 
    
Log High School 0.226 0.184 0.242 
(Lagged) (1.78) (1.43) (1.93) 
    
Log Prison -0.0113 -0.0132 -0.0115 
(Lagged) (-0.61) (-0.71) (-0.62) 
N 2539 2534 2539 
t statistics in parentheses 















































Binary and COPS 
Interaction 










Log Non-Police Spending 0.0590* 0.208** 0.0590* 0.0590* 0.0591* 
 (2.25) (3.11) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) 
      
Log COPS  -0.00329    
  (-0.98)    
      
Log COPS2   0.0000201   
   (0.06)   
      
COPS Binary    0.000497 0.000841 
    (0.08) (0.13) 
      
COPS Interaction     -0.000391 
     (-0.15) 
 
Log Police Spending 0.480*** 0.452*** 0.480*** 0.480*** 0.480*** 
(Lagged) (25.64) (11.57) (25.63) (25.63) (25.63) 
      
Log Total Crime Rate 0.0293 -0.0229 0.0293 0.0293 0.0294 
(Lagged) (1.75) (-0.58) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75) 
      
Log City Population -2.628*** -1.093 -2.625*** -2.625*** -2.621*** 
(Lagged) (-4.99) (-0.73) (-4.98) (-4.97) (-4.96) 
      
Log City Population Squared 0.102*** 0.0472 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
(Lagged) (4.90) (0.81) (4.89) (4.88) (4.87) 
      
Log Median Income 0.349*** -0.0725 0.349*** 0.349*** 0.349*** 
(Lagged) (4.22) (-0.36) (4.21) (4.21) (4.21) 
      
Log State Aid 0.0270 0.106** 0.0271 0.0271 0.0270 
 (1.46) (2.64) (1.46) (1.46) (1.46) 
      
Log Federal Aid 0.0109* 0.0456*** 0.0109* 0.0109* 0.0109* 
 (2.20) (4.10) (2.20) (2.20) (2.20) 
      
Log Age 0.681*** 0.187 0.681*** 0.681*** 0.682*** 
(Lagged) (4.07) (0.42) (4.07) (4.07) (4.08) 
      
Log Youth 0.164* 0.266 0.164* 0.164* 0.165* 
(Lagged) (2.15) (1.33) (2.15) (2.15) (2.15) 
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Log White -0.0555 0.0672 -0.0555 -0.0554 -0.0553 
(Lagged) (-1.63) (0.65) (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.62) 
      
Log Black 0.0403* 0.0928 0.0403* 0.0403* 0.0403* 
(Lagged) (2.22) (1.46) (2.22) (2.22) (2.22) 
      
Log Hispanic 0.0398** 0.0193 0.0398** 0.0398** 0.0398** 
(Lagged) (3.06) (0.45) (3.06) (3.06) (3.06) 
      
Log Unemployment 0.0207 0.0487 0.0207 0.0207 0.0208 
(Lagged) (1.41) (1.49) (1.41) (1.41) (1.41) 
      
Log Income Inequality 0.304 0.138 0.304 0.304 0.304 
(Lagged) (1.72) (0.33) (1.72) (1.72) (1.72) 
      
Log College -0.122 0.190 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 
(Lagged) (-1.71) (0.97) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.72) 
      
Log High School 0.194 -0.0902 0.195 0.195 0.195 
(Lagged) (1.54) (-0.25) (1.54) (1.54) (1.54) 
      
Log Prison -0.0131 -0.0484 -0.0131 -0.0131 -0.0132 
(Lagged) (-0.71) (-0.88) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.72) 
N 2506 939 2506 2506 2506 
t statistics in parentheses 





Table 4.1 – Results of Crime Rates – Total, Violent, Property 
 
 With Total Crime 
Rate 
With Violent Crime 
Rate 
With Property Crime 
Rate 
 Log Total Crime Rate Log Violent Crime Rate Log Property Crime Rate 
Log Police Spending -0.0461*** -0.0419* -0.0425** 
 (-3.40) (-2.06) (-3.14) 
    
Log Total Crime Rate 0.810***   
(Lagged) (66.96)   
    
Log Violent Crime Rate  0.809***  
(Lagged)  (67.94)  
    
Log Property Crime Rate   0.803*** 
(Lagged)   (65.92) 
 
Log Non-Police Spending 0.0272 0.0197 0.0267 
 (1.39) (0.67) (1.33) 
    
Log City Population 0.176 0.893 0.117 
 (0.45) (1.51) (0.29) 
    
Log City Population Squared -0.00877 -0.0358 -0.00666 
 (-0.57) (-1.52) (-0.42) 
    
Log Median Income 0.0354 -0.109 0.0644 
 (0.60) (-1.24) (1.06) 
    
Log State Aid -0.00232 0.0227 -0.00725 
 (-0.17) (1.13) (-0.53) 
    
Log Federal Aid -0.000944 0.00112 -0.00184 
 (-0.26) (0.21) (-0.50) 
    
Log Age 0.472*** 0.128 0.521*** 
 (3.96) (0.72) (4.25) 
    
Log Youth 0.152** 0.106 0.155** 
 (2.77) (1.30) (2.75) 
    
Log White 0.00837 0.0804* 0.00530 
 (0.34) (2.18) (0.21) 
    
Log Black 0.0308* 0.0428* 0.0294* 
 (2.33) (2.15) (2.17) 
    
Log Hispanic 0.0359*** 0.00856 0.0401*** 
 (3.78) (0.62) (4.11) 
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Log Unemployment -0.00987 -0.0224 -0.0105 
 (-0.93) (-1.41) (-0.97) 
    
Log Income Inequality -0.243 -0.567** -0.157 
 (-1.93) (-2.99) (-1.22) 
    
Log College -0.0699 -0.0609 -0.0760 
 (-1.37) (-0.80) (-1.46) 
    
Log High School 0.0570 0.0261 0.0737 
 (0.63) (0.19) (0.79) 
    
Log Prison -0.0110 -0.00435 -0.0116 
 (-0.82) (-0.21) (-0.84) 
N 2472 2479 2503 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 4.2 – Results of Crime Rates – Violent Breakdown 
 








 Log Murder 
Rate 






Log Police Spending -0.0421 0.0289 -0.0264 -0.0718*** 
 (-0.85) (0.92) (-0.94) (-3.31) 
     
Log Murder Rate 0.294***    
(Lagged) (14.90)    
     
Log Rape Rate  0.669***   
(Lagged)  (42.13)   
     
Log Assault Rate   0.802***  
(Lagged)   (67.48)  
     
Log Robbery Rate    0.771*** 
(Lagged)    (60.76) 
 
Log Non-Police Spending -0.175* 0.00805 0.00860 0.0390 
 (-2.37) (0.18) (0.21) (1.21) 
     
Log City Population 0.904 -0.294 1.841* 0.00315 
 (0.62) (-0.32) (2.22) (0.00) 
     
Log City Population Squared -0.0467 0.00809 -0.0712* -0.00365 
 (-0.81) (0.22) (-2.17) (-0.14) 
     
Log Median Income -0.0441 -0.442** -0.241 0.0811 
 (-0.20) (-3.23) (-1.94) (0.84) 
     
Log State Aid 0.0740 -0.0612* 0.0624* -0.0358 
 (1.48) (-1.97) (2.20) (-1.62) 
     
Log Federal Aid 0.0178 -0.00811 0.00535 -0.00589 
 (1.32) (-0.97) (0.70) (-1.00) 
     
Log Age 1.458** 0.282 -0.241 0.832*** 
 (3.26) (1.02) (-0.96) (4.22) 
     
Log Youth 1.002*** -0.214 0.0651 0.286** 
 (4.82) (-1.70) (0.57) (3.18) 
     
Log White 0.00825 0.00505 0.123* 0.0268 
 (0.09) (0.09) (2.38) (0.67) 
     
Log Black 0.145** 0.0658* 0.0370 0.0767*** 
 (2.93) (2.12) (1.32) (3.48) 
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Log Hispanic 0.121*** 0.0279 -0.0125 0.0568*** 
 (3.51) (1.31) (-0.65) (3.68) 
     
Log Unemployment 0.0588 -0.0852*** -0.0157 -0.0204 
 (1.47) (-3.44) (-0.70) (-1.17) 
     
Log Income Inequality 0.911 -0.568 -0.804** -0.343 
 (1.93) (-1.93) (-3.02) (-1.66) 
     
Log College -0.234 0.230* -0.0149 -0.104 
 (-1.24) (1.97) (-0.14) (-1.25) 
     
Log High School 0.424 -0.673** 0.110 -0.235 
 (1.25) (-3.20) (0.57) (-1.58) 
     
Log Prison -0.249*** 0.0305 0.0225 -0.0667** 
 (-4.89) (0.97) (0.78) (-3.00) 
N 2496 2479 2510 2510 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 4.3 – Results of Crime Rates – Property Breakdown 
 
 With Burglary Rate With Larceny Rate With Vehicle Theft Rate 
 Log Burglary Rate Log Larceny Rate Log Vehicle Theft Rate 
Log Police Spending -0.0563** -0.0313* -0.0565* 
 (-3.19) (-2.09) (-2.34) 
    
Log Burglary Rate 0.795***   
(Lagged) (63.79)   
    
Log Larceny Rate  0.782***  
(Lagged)  (61.52)  
    
Log Vehicle Theft Rate   0.849*** 
(Lagged)   (79.58) 
 
Log Non-Police Spending 0.0446 0.0116 0.0653 
 (1.70) (0.52) (1.82) 
    
Log City Population -0.166 0.00589 1.490* 
 (-0.32) (0.01) (2.09) 
    
Log City Population Squared 0.00354 -0.00210 -0.0606* 
 (0.17) (-0.12) (-2.15) 
    
Log Median Income -0.0554 0.110 0.126 
 (-0.70) (1.64) (1.17) 
    
Log State Aid -0.0117 0.00213 -0.0613* 
 (-0.65) (0.14) (-2.49) 
    
Log Federal Aid -0.00337 -0.00266 -0.00577 
 (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.88) 
    
Log Age 0.527*** 0.486*** 0.421 
 (3.31) (3.60) (1.93) 
    
Log Youth 0.193** 0.197** -0.0269 
 (2.65) (3.17) (-0.27) 
    
Log White 0.0183 -0.00681 0.00685 
 (0.56) (-0.24) (0.15) 
    
Log Black 0.0374* 0.0239 0.0476 
 (2.12) (1.59) (1.95) 
    
Log Hispanic 0.0477*** 0.0370*** 0.0474** 
 (3.73) (3.47) (2.82) 
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Log Unemployment 0.0309* -0.00914 -0.0844*** 
 (2.16) (-0.76) (-4.32) 
    
Log Income Inequality -0.594*** 0.100 -0.122 
 (-3.54) (0.70) (-0.53) 
    
Log College -0.0229 -0.116* -0.0568 
 (-0.34) (-2.01) (-0.61) 
    
Log High School 0.0266 0.205* -0.168 
 (0.22) (1.96) (-1.02) 
    
Log Prison -0.0241 0.00694 -0.0773** 
 (-1.33) (0.45) (-3.09) 
N 2510 2503 2510 
t statistics in parentheses 






Table 5 – Results of New Crime Categories 
 
 With New Violent Rate With New Property Rate 
 Log New Violent Rate Log New Property Rate 
Log Police Spending -0.0237 -0.0437** 
 (-0.91) (-3.27) 
   
Log New Violent Rate 0.802***  
(Lagged) (66.29)  
   
Log New Property Rate  0.808*** 
(Lagged)  (67.24) 
 
Log Non-Police Spending 0.00686 0.0277 
 (0.18) (1.39) 
   
Log City Population 1.692* 0.107 
 (2.24) (0.27) 
   
Log City Population Squared -0.0659* -0.00627 
 (-2.20) (-0.40) 
   
Log Median Income -0.223* 0.0614 
 (-1.99) (1.03) 
   
Log State Aid 0.0484 -0.00694 
 (1.89) (-0.51) 
   
Log Federal Aid 0.00387 -0.00194 
 (0.56) (-0.53) 
   
Log Age -0.220 0.530*** 
 (-0.97) (4.37) 
   
Log Youth 0.0282 0.160** 
 (0.27) (2.88) 
   
Log White 0.109* 0.00512 
 (2.31) (0.21) 
   
Log Black 0.0350 0.0303* 
 (1.39) (2.26) 
   
Log Hispanic -0.0140 0.0398*** 
 (-0.80) (4.12) 
   
Log Unemployment -0.0218 -0.0108 
 (-1.08) (-1.00) 
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Log Income Inequality -0.660** -0.177 
 (-2.73) (-1.39) 
   
Log College -0.0111 -0.0725 
 (-0.12) (-1.41) 
   
Log High School 0.0961 0.0514 
 (0.56) (0.56) 
   
Log Prison 0.0214 -0.0134 
 (0.83) (-0.98) 
N 2479 2503 
t statistics in parentheses 
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